The Iran NIE

Tom Joscelyn at the Weekly Standard asks five important questions, with the most disturbing being number three:

[H]ow did the [Intelligence Community] draw its line between a "civilian" nuclear program and a military one?

In the very first footnote the authors of the NIE explain: "For the purposes of this Estimate, by ‘nuclear weapons program’ we mean Iran’s nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work; we do not mean Iran’s declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment."

So, is the IC then assuming that Iran’s "declared civil work" is necessarily benign? One of the key issues with respect to Iran’s "civilian" nuclear program is its capacity, with some tweaking here and there, to be used for military purposes. For example, according to the New York Times in early 2006, the IAEA concluded that there was evidence suggesting "links between Iran’s ostensibly peaceful nuclear program and its military work on high explosives and missiles." Indeed, the authors of the NIE explicitly recognize the possibility of the civilian program being diverted for military uses:
Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so. For example, Iran’s civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing. We also assess with high confidence that since fall 2003, Iran has been conducting research and development projects with commercial and conventional military applications—some of which would also be of limited use for nuclear weapons.
So, then, the NIE’s conclusions apply strictly to Iran’s alleged halt of its military and clandestine programs. As we know, however, uranium enrichment is the most important component of developing the bomb and Iran indisputably has the capacity. (Again, with some tweaking, Iran can use its declared enrichment facilities at some point to make weapons-grade material.)
Now, some thoughts of my own:

1) The publication of the NIE brings into the light a long-running and mysterous internal debate within the Bush administration. For many months, there has been a huge discrepancy between the president's words and the administration's actions on the subject of Iran. The president talked fierce - but the administration acted very cautiously. Now we understand why.

This discrepancy underlay my often-repeated contention in this space that there would be no military strike against Iran during the Bush administration. Basically, I extrapolated from my observations of the struggle over the president's "democracy agenda": The president issued bold declarations that meant little in practice, either because he never really meant them or because he lacked the means to enforce his will upon his government. Either way, I expected the same pattern to hold good with regard to Iran policy, and so it has.


2) There has been a lot of foolish talk about how this release must somehow be unwelcome to the president, the administration, or "neocons" within the administration. That seems very unconvincing to me. On the contrary, given that the administration has no clear idea of what to do about Iran, a document that effectively takes them off the hook has to be highly welcome. Far from chomping at the opportunity for conflict with Iran, the Bush administration has persistently and consistently sought to avoid it - not only in the nuclear area, but also by downplaying Iranian support for the insurgency in Iraq.

3) No question, any slowdown in the Iranian nuclear program counts as good news. But the release of this NIE may function as "self-liquidating" good news. Release of the NIE will likely undercut international support for sanctions and other pressures on Iran - and that may in turn undermine Iranian compliance.

4) At the same time, the release of the report creates some very real opportunities for US policy. A US strie on Iran was bound to be a hugely costly policy - perhaps necessary, but costly. If it is right that we face no immediate need for such a strike, those costs can be postponed.

The real strategic center of gravity in Iran has never been the nuclear program, but always Iranian public opinion. Iran is a textbook illustration of Abraham Lincoln's dictum that the best way to eliminate an enemy is to turn him into a friend. We want to position the US as the advocate for and liberator of Iran's oppressed population - not a threatening presence lusting for an excuse to bomb them. If the nuclear issue moves down the agenda, that opens the way for human rights, democracy, and terrorism to climb higher.

5) Joe Klein and others have opined that the NIE helps the Democratic candidates for president by refocusing the election on domestic issues. Maybe. Equally though it relieves the stress on the Republican field by reassuring Americans that a vote for the GOP in 2008 is not automatically a vote for war with Iran.